Title VII cases often are resolved without a trial. Whether the District Court properly entered summary judgment for the employer is the subject of many Eleventh Circuit appeals. A significant decision, Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) held that a triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision maker." And it is well-settled that if a plaintiff presents a prima facie case together with evidence tending to discredit the employer's proffered reasons for the alleged discriminatory action the trier of fact may reasonably conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133 (2000) in which the U.S. Supreme Court so held, stating specifically that no additional evidence of discrimination is needed to create a genuine factual issue.
Some District Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have construed language such as the following from Brooks v. County Commission, 446 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2006) to say otherwise: "A reason is not a pretext for discrimination 'unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." In a number of reported cases an employer's motion for summary judgment was granted based on the above, even though there was persuasive evidence to discredit what the employer put forward as reasons the plaintiff was fired, disciplined, not promoted or not hired.
The quoted language in Brooks comes from a 1993 Supreme Court decision, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The issue there, however, was not whether evidence discrediting the employer's explanation for its actions may permit a jury to find for the plaintiff but whether such evidence compels judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant/employer. Justice Scalia writing for the majority clearly stated that "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination" - all that is required for the Title VII plaintiff to avoid summary judgment. He added that "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required."
The often-quoted language in Brooks should be read in the context of the St. Mary's decision. The majority reversed the ruling of the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals which had held that if the plaintiff proves the employer's explanation to be false the plaintiff wins the case, stating "But a reason cannot be proved to be "a pretext for discrimination" unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason." There is a difference between whether the fact of discrimination is proved and therefore supports judgment for the plaintiff and whether it is "genuinely disputed" which is all the plaintiff must show to avoid summary judgment or a Rule 50 motion and get the case to a jury.
That evidence which might persuade the jury to disbelieve the employer's stated reasons together with the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination "will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination" is still the law, as was driven home by the Supreme Court in Reeves.
In decisions predating and also following Reeves the Eleventh Circuit has held many times that the plaintiff's prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to disbelieve the employer's explanation always creates a jury issue. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997) - before Reeves - and Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, 223 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) - citing Reeves.
Decisions such as Brooks which lift the language from St. Mary's Honor Center and weave it into summary judgment rulings create the wrong impression that the plaintiff may not avoid summary judgment unless he or she presents more than just a prima facie case and evidence the employer's explanation is false.
Some District Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have construed language such as the following from Brooks v. County Commission, 446 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2006) to say otherwise: "A reason is not a pretext for discrimination 'unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." In a number of reported cases an employer's motion for summary judgment was granted based on the above, even though there was persuasive evidence to discredit what the employer put forward as reasons the plaintiff was fired, disciplined, not promoted or not hired.
The quoted language in Brooks comes from a 1993 Supreme Court decision, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The issue there, however, was not whether evidence discrediting the employer's explanation for its actions may permit a jury to find for the plaintiff but whether such evidence compels judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant/employer. Justice Scalia writing for the majority clearly stated that "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination" - all that is required for the Title VII plaintiff to avoid summary judgment. He added that "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required."
The often-quoted language in Brooks should be read in the context of the St. Mary's decision. The majority reversed the ruling of the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals which had held that if the plaintiff proves the employer's explanation to be false the plaintiff wins the case, stating "But a reason cannot be proved to be "a pretext for discrimination" unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason." There is a difference between whether the fact of discrimination is proved and therefore supports judgment for the plaintiff and whether it is "genuinely disputed" which is all the plaintiff must show to avoid summary judgment or a Rule 50 motion and get the case to a jury.
That evidence which might persuade the jury to disbelieve the employer's stated reasons together with the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination "will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination" is still the law, as was driven home by the Supreme Court in Reeves.
In decisions predating and also following Reeves the Eleventh Circuit has held many times that the plaintiff's prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to disbelieve the employer's explanation always creates a jury issue. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997) - before Reeves - and Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, 223 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) - citing Reeves.
Decisions such as Brooks which lift the language from St. Mary's Honor Center and weave it into summary judgment rulings create the wrong impression that the plaintiff may not avoid summary judgment unless he or she presents more than just a prima facie case and evidence the employer's explanation is false.
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